Who payed the critics

it is the rare 'crazy' movie that actually has something to say.

The movie's neither hopeful in contrived ways, nor hopeless in different contrived ways. Somehow it manages to be wonderful

There are moments that feel comical, some horrific, and some downright inspiring but the tonal shifts hardly matter as the end results come to a film that's perfect for this time.

This is an amazing conformation of the Bush administrations utter failure in the handling of the Iraq war. A girl scoot troop could have made better and more informed decisions. Perhaps even a troop of monkeys would have done a better job then Bush's henchmen?The errors in judgment and lack of military experience within the administration are both appalling and telling of the Bush white house. Every military expert was systematically ignored or sidelined. It's as if the Bush administration's primary and sole interest or concern was the protection and acquisition of Iraq's oil provisions.This film is a testament to the complete and absolute failure of the Bush presidency.

What this movie is NOT about: The decisions that led to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the twists and turns America took on the path to war - if that's what you want, seek out something else, such as the outstanding Frontline documentary "Bush's War". What this movie IS about: The film begins with the ending of "major hostilities" in Iraq, and carefully step-by-step examines the mishandling of the post-war occupation. Through interviews with people connected to the occupation at many different levels, it paints a picture of terrible mishandling and astounding arrogance on the part of few who held sway over so many.Kind of like if the events in a disastrous train wreck were caught in slow motion - viewing the film would be informative, horrible, and fascinating all at the same time.

I wish to compliment this piece alongside another British theater play called Stuff Happens. The content of both pieces—No End in Sight & Stuff Happens—displayed pithy and compelling accounts of the events that led to the US's involvement in the Iraq war, yet both were also respectfully motivated by political agendas. I do not mean to imply that these pieces were mere exercises in propaganda (though some might argue otherwise), but rather that they attempted to display the facts as objectively as possible while simultaneously suggesting the imprudence, and perhaps immoral behavior of the Bush Administration. Both pieces are enormously complex and in no way can provide easy solutions to the monster that the US has helped create. Of course, it is difficult for US citizens to even think they have helped create this monster—most would rather scapegoat such responsibility to their government leaders; leaders chosen by the majority of US citizens. The argument that both pieces seem to make is: Are Americans right for shifting this blame to the Bush Administration? As both would heavily suggest, they are.I felt that Stuff Happens was weaker in its execution as compared to No End in Sight because it relied more upon speculative guesswork than factual information. I do not deny that much of the information was taken from real-life news conferences, television interviews and public addresses; however, the closed-door conferences, especially the private meetings between Bush and Tony Blair created more of a dramatized and perhaps even fictional quality to the piece, thus lessening the play's credibility and overall objectivity. As to what was exchanged during those meetings can only be assumed. But the premise of assuming the truth only precludes certainty from solidifying the truth, and can therefore only lie within the realms of either probability or possibility. The author can rightfully exclude the possibility of those conversations taking place—and indeed, I think he knows he's beyond possibility. He's made a much more persuasive argument that leans upon probability; probability of the US's mistake to enter the war, and is upheld by various witnesses that sensed the immorality of the Administration. Where the author of Stuff Happens argument is weakened by excessive assumption, the author of No End in Sight strengthens the same argument by more reliance upon facts, thereby lessening the viewer's skepticism. The film does not attempt to necessarily hide or manipulate the facts, but rather ironically suggests those who would hide from and manipulate the facts. The author suggests that the viewer has very good reasons to be skeptical of the US' political leaders because many of them refused to be interviewed for the film. The implication here could mean multiple things: those who hide from the truth; those guilty of creating the Iraqi monster; those who refuse to take responsibility for the war, and so forth. Could some of these implications be true? Yes, and indeed I think some of them are, but I also think the issue is more complicated than that. I think it is unfair to label the entire Bush Administration as wholly corrupt. In other words, the author still had an agenda behind the piece. Perhaps certain members of the Administration had denied interview access because of how their words might have been spun out of context to fit another's opposing agenda. That could be true too. The author is only showing what he chooses to show, but I must admit he did a pretty good job of persuading an opinion that seems more probable of proving the dirt on our leader's hands. He carefully created a persuasive tapestry of political hypocrisy—showing how remarks made by certain members of the Administration contradicted what was actually taking place out in Iraq. For example, cabinet member Rumsfeld told political news analysts and journalists that there was no insurgency or anarchy in Iraq—the on-sight film footage, however, proved those statements false; President Bush is shown speaking about giving Iraq food, freedom and prosperity—again, the footage contradicts his words. The author uses other contrapuntal and ironic devices to stress the idea of the Administration's corruption: US soldiers listening to country music while killing Iraqi citizens, as well as other juxtapositions of the Administration joking with the newsroom about the situation at hand.Both pieces are powerful in their aims. Stuff Happens falls slightly behind No End in Sight regarding credibility, while No End in Sight secures a very sturdy position in its attempts to awaken more Americans to political awareness and activity. It's a formidable piece that will not easily be conquered and will be remembered for many future years to come. All Americans can benefit from watching this film closely and pondering upon what is shown. I highly recommend it.

There are so many negative Documentires out there about the 2nd Iraq invasion and this one is the best. No End in Sight breaks down exactly, step by step, how the Iraq war went wrong...well...terribly wrong. But as this excellent new documentary shows, things went wrong for reasons—because of how the war was planned and executed.Or how it wasn't planned. How ultimately, completely unqualified people were left in charge. Here are some of the mistakes that No End in Sight elucidates for us: 1. Nobody knew anything. Out of a basic US cadre of roughly 130 people first sent in to run things, only 5 knew Arabic. Nobody knew from factions. What a Shiite and a Sunni and a Kurd were they found out later. Instead of realizing what leaders would emerge (such as the most popular man in Iraq now, Muqtada Sadr), the neo-cons sent in Ahmed Chalabi, a corrupt exile without credibility or authority, believing he would be the new leader. They didn't know how many troops were required to maintain order, and Rumsfeld, trying to prove a cockeyed theory he had no knowledge to support, chose too few. (Then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had pointed this out to the Senate before the war even began.) 2. Nobody, neither Americans nor Iraqis, was designated to maintain order. Chaos reigned. "Stuff happens," said Rumsfeld. No: "stuff" doesn't just happen: it's allowed to happen. As Seth Moulton, a young Marine officer who is one of Ferguson's voices says, "We were Marines. We could have stopped looting." But they were not directed to do so. The troops, already too few, just stood around and watched as Baghdad was torn apart, the national library burned, the national museum looted. All the ministry buildings were dismantled and looted—tellingly, only the Ministry of Petroleum was guarded. Baghdad's water and electricity fell apart, and links with the rest of the country turned into wild and dangerous interzones. Most important of all for the maintenance of order, large caches of arms were unknown to US troops—and insurgents pillaged them.Iraq was lost in the first week of the occupation. But worse was yet to come. And worse. And worse. A key moment was the replacement of ORHA, The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), headed by Jay Garner, which was not allowed to protect any of its sites, by the CPA, the Coalition Provisional Authority, headed by the arrogant Paul Bremer.3. This is when the US destroyed the country's human infrastructure, and in so doing sowed the seeds of insurgency and civil war. The occupation fired the entire Iraqi standing army, half a million officers and men alike, and dismissed and barred from work 50,000 "Baathist" government officials and employees. Rendering all these people unemployed dealt a huge economic blow to the country in itself. But far worse than that, it led to permanent conflict—ultimately to civil war. It created many enemies, and it left no one to work with. At this point the goodwill the Americans had won by toppling the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein was lost. The violence and lawlessness that had been allowed to proceed unchecked began to become organized. Began to have a cause.4. Many of the Americans sent in to help with occupation and reconstruction had nothing to work with. Ambassador Barbara Bodine (in charge of Baghdad in spring 2003) arrived to find offices supplied to her and her staff that were empty rooms with no computers, not even telephones. But as she says on screen, it didn't matter because they had no phone lists—and no one to call.Nir Rosen is one of the most knowledgeable and independent American journalists in Iraq and a producer and talking head of this film. As he has recently said, Iraq today, four and a half years later, is a region of city-states, a source of instability to the whole area, to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Iran, even perhaps to Egypt. Pacifying and controlling Baghdad no longer means anything because Baghdad doesn't control the country—if you can call it a country. The US forces are just another militia, the most hated but not the most effective.First-time director Charles Ferguson gives us the various figures, the cold facts, the cost, the numbers of dead and wounded. But what most matters is what people have to say, and Ferguson has assembled some key talking heads. These include former Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Ambassador Bodine, Colin Powell's former chief of staff Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, Col. James Hodges, soon-replaced Iraq viceroy Jay Garner (who like others strenuously objected to the dismissal of the army and the debathification, but was ignored by his replacement, Paul Bremer), Bremer adviser Walter Slocombe, frustrated ORHA functionary Paul Hughes, and other diplomats, journalists, officers, and enlisted personnel who were there in Iraq after the invasion.Ferguson has a doctorate from MIT, where he has taught; is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution (he's an insider!); and has authored three books on information technology. His approach is analytical. The basic problem was that the usual suspects—Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, & Co.—had spent virtually no time on planning the aftermath of "Shock and Awe"--the occupation. It was all planned, skimpily, at the last minute, deliberately ignoring all the experts' advice.The entire movie essentially proves that carelessness is the true axis of evil. This was the only Bush/War Documentary to be nominated for an Oscar. ( not that means anything). It didn't get a wide viewing so most people don't know about it, which makes it even more important to see.We get to see a lot of political documentaries now so we have learned to judge them. This is a very fine one—and for Americans an essential one.This is the best Iraq War documentary I've seen yet and I've seen a lot